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Formal verification of system-of-systems uses 
computer-based techniques to assure that the behavior of 
a subject system of systems complies with its formal 
correctness specifications.  Such formal specifications are 
often created on the basis of natural-language (NL) 
requirement specifications. While NL documents such as 
marketing requirement documents and concept-of-
operation (CONOPS) documents contain NL 
requirements, they are almost never complete, i.e., they 
omit necessary NL requirements. To that end, UML 
analysis is an increasingly popular technique for 
requirement elicitation. This paper describes the process 
of identifying NL requirements of interest from UML 
analysis diagrams such as activity diagrams) and 
Message Sequence Diagrams.    
1 Introduction 
In [Br], Bruggue described UML-based process for re-
quirement elicitation. One of the first steps of this process 
is UML use-case analysis, which results in use-case dia-
grams and use-case documents. A use-case document 
aligns user needs with system functionality by directly 
stating the user intention and system response for each 
step in a particular interaction. 
While use-case documents are written in Natural Lan-
guage (NL), the UML provides diagrammatic languages 
that capture behavior embedded in use-cases. Two pri-
mary such languages are Activity diagrams (AD’s) – used 
primarily to capture workflow-like behavioral,  and Mes-
sage Sequence Charts (MSC’s) – used primarily to cap-
ture event driven behavior. 
While mostly informal in UML-1, AD’s and MSC’s 
have been empowered in UML-2 to be more rigorous and 
accurate. The jury is still out on the formal descriptive 
power of these languages; some would argue that UML-2 
AD’s and MSC’s are as formal as it gets, while other’s 
claim that they (especially AD’s) are still not formal 
enough. Either way, this paper focuses on the rather in-
formal UML-1 level AD’s and MSC’s. This is for several 
reasons: 
1. These are the most commonly used forms of 
AD’s and MSC’s.  
2. Our tool chain does not support computer-aided 
verification using AD-based or MSC-based for-
mal specification, rendering the investment in 
building rigorous formal AD or MSC specifica-
tions wasteful. 
3. As discussed in chapter 2, a significant learning 
curve and significant additional investment are 
required to step up from a UML-1 level AD or 
MSC to a rigorous and formal UML-2 level dia-
gram. 
Formal requirement specifications are specifications 
that are readable and executable by a computer based 
verification system. Many formal specification languages 
have been described in the literature, including linear-time 
temporal logic (LTL) [LTL], branching-time temporal 
logics [CTL], and statechart assertions [Dr1]. The ulti-
mate purpose of formal specifications is for subsequent 
computer-aided verification, using techniques such a 
model-checking, theorem proving, and run-time monitor-
ing; [DMS] provides a three dimensional comparison of 
these three primary verification techniques.  
Harel statecharts [Ha], currently part of the UML stan-
dard, are typically used for design analysis and implemen-
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tation. In his recent book [Dr1], the author suggested us-
ing deterministic and non-deterministic statecharts-
assertions for formal requirement specification and run-
time verification. This approach is currently in active use 
by the NASA IV&V facility.  
As described in [Dr1], formal specification assertions 
for reactive systems are typically based on NL require-
ments. For example, Fig. 1 depicts the statechart assertion 
for the NL requirement R1: whenever delayRequest then 
no ack is permitted for 30 seconds. Once the formal speci-
fication assertion is constructed, the process of validation 
testing is applied to that assertion to assure that the asser-
tion’s behavior actually conforms to the expected behav-
ior of NL requirement. In other words, validation is the 
process of certifying the assertion as a trust-worthy repre-
sentative of the NL requirement. 
 
Figure 1. Statechart assertion for NL requirement R1. 
Hence, the NL and formal requirement elicitation and 
development process described thus far is depicted in Fig. 
2: 
 
Figure 2. From UML elicitation to formal-specification 
assertion 
This paper addresses the process of identifying behav-
ioral concerns for a reactive system of systems, i.e., con-
cerns that lead to eventual NL requirements. It does so by 
addressing areas of concerns from an activity diagram 
point of view, as illustrated in Fig. 2.  
Although the paper focuses on UML AD analysis the 
same process can be applied to UML MSC diagrams.   
2 The Formality of Activity Diagrams 
and MSC Diagrams  
UML-1 AD and MSC diagrams are used almost exclu-
sively as non-executable artifacts, mainly for purposes of 
documentation, human based analysis, and the exchange 
of ideas between stake holders. I coin this type of use as 
wall-paper because these diagrams typically end-up cov-
ering walls in conference rooms. In contrast, assertions 
are executable, and are constructed with the ultimate pur-
pose of being used for subsequent computer-aided verifi-
cation. 
In their commonly used form, AD’s and MSC’s are in-
formal, i.e., while they do convey a general “look and 
feel” for a scenario of interest, they are ambiguous when 
it comes to precise details of legal and illegal variations of 
this scenario. For example, consider the AD of Fig. 3. It 
does not clearly specify whether, upon fulfillment of the 
preconditions for this AD (scheduled downlink), the final 
activity (Receive downlink) must be executed or not (i.e., 
perhaps all the AD specified is that the Receive downlink 
activity can-be executed). Specifically, the actual system 
might execute activity A, then B, then C and E, but not 
Receive-downlink; the AD of Fig. 3 does not specify 
whether this is legal or illegal behavior. 
In fact, that the AD of Fig. 3 (excluding the extension) 
specifies explicitly only the following two legal scenarios:  
Seq-1: schedule-downlink followed-by activity A, fol-
lowed-by activity B, followed-by parallel activities C and 
E, and finally activity Receive-downlink.  
Seq-2: schedule-downlink followed-by activity B, fol-
lowed-by parallel activities C and E, and finally activity 
Receive-downlink 
Hence, the AD of Fig. 3 does not specify whether scenar-
ios that are not explicitly depicted are legal or not, such 
as: 
Seq-3: identical to Seq-1 but without activity B. 
Seq-4: identical to Seq-1 but without activity C.  
Etc. 
There are two possible ways of addressing this limitation: 
1. To create powerful AD-based and MSC-based formal 
specification languages. The following attempts at 
doing so have been reported in the literature: 
a. Live Sequence Diagrams (LSC’s) [LSC], an 
extension of MSC diagrams with must (denoted 
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as hot, or red) activities, and can (denoted as 
cold, or blue) activities.  
b. MSC-assertions [DS1, DST], a super posi-
tioning of statechart-assertions on top of MSC 
diagrams. 
c. UML-2 AD and MSC diagrams [UML2]. As 
discussed in the introduction UML 2 has im-
proved the power of these formalisms to a degree 
that they no longer specify only a small set of al-
lowable scenarios.  
2. The approach described in this paper: to create ex-
ecutable assertions for key concerns, to then formal-
ize them as statechart assertions, to validate those as-
sertions against expected behavior, and then deploy 
those assertions for verification. 
This paper uses the second approach for the following 
reasons: 
• With the exception of MSC-assertions, assertions 
created with the approaches listed in item 1 do not 
have associated computer-aided verification tools and 
cannot be used for subsequent verification.  
• Our experience with MSC-Assertions (e.g., see 
[DST]) and LSC’s has shown that as the level of for-
malism in the underlying diagram type increases 
(e.g., from informal UML-1 AD to fully specified 
and unambiguous UML-2 diagrams) they become 
considerably more difficult to use when compared 
with the simple, familiar, and intuitive statechart-
assertion based approach.  
• This paper described results of an on-going effort 
with NASA and was influenced to a large degree by 
the availability of stable and productive academic and 
commercial tools for validation and verification. 
Consequently, the most suitable formal specification 
tool was found to be one that supports statechart-
assertions [TRSI].   
 
 
Figure 3. An activity Diagram 
3 From AD to NL Requirements 
3.1 Must vs. Can 
As discussed earlier, the AD of Fig. 3 lists only two ex-
plicit legal scenarios. It is unlikely however that the actual 
system has only two possible use-case scenarios. It is 
therefore likely that other legal scenarios exists, some 
captured by some other AD’s. This explains how a se-
quence such as Seq-3 or Seq-4 could actually happen, 
namely, when a different AD specifies such a scenario. In 
this case, a concern for the developer of the AD of Fig. 3 
is whether Seq-3 and Seq-4 are legal or not. If illegal, 
then these concerns are candidates for a NL requirements, 
such as: 
R2: whenever schedule-downlink then activity Receive-
downlink must eventually be performed. 
R3: whenever Activity-B is executed then both activity C 
and E must follow. 
3.2 Repetitions 
Consider the AD of Fig. 3 again. Say the system performs 
one of the the following sequences: 
Seq-5: schedule-downlink followed-by activity A, fol-
lowed-by activity A again, followed-by activity B, fol-
lowed-by parallel activities C and E, and finally activity 
Receive-downlink. 
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Seq-6: schedule-downlink followed-by activity A, fol-
lowed-by activity B, followed-by activity A again, fol-
lowed-by parallel activities C and E, and finally activity 
Receive-downlink. 
The concern raised by these scenarios is whether multiple 
executions of an activity violate the intention of the AD or 
not. A possible NL requirement that covers such a con-
cern is: 
R4: whenever activity A executes it should never execute 
again until Receive downlink activity executes. 
3.3 Loops 
 Consider the AD of Fig. 4, which contains the AD of Fig. 
3 with an extension for the case where downlink (the final 
activity) fails. 
 
Figure 4. The AD of Fig. 3 with an extension. 
An obvious concern here is how many times it is legal for 
the downlink to repeatedly fail (and thereby launch the 
extension loop to repeatedly execute).  
3.4 Multi-object Systems 
Suppose a plurality of objects or processes have the ca-
pacity of performing activities A, B, and C in the AD of 
Fig. 3. In such a case, a concern is whether Seq-1 is legal 
even if activities within Seq-1 are not all executed by the 
same object (e.g., object #1 executes A while object #2 
executes B). Note that a swim-lane in an AD (e.g., Sys-
tem-A in Fig. 3) is commonly considered as an object 
type, but it’s unclear from this specific AD description 
whether the system-of-systems is guaranteed to contain 
precisely one sub-system of such a type. 
3.5 Reentrancy 
Consider the AD of Fig. 5. Suppose that a legal scenario 
executes activities C, D, and E concurrently, as specified. 
Suppose also that the instrument malfunctions causing the 
extension to execute as specified. One immediate concern 
is what should happen with activities D and E? If D is 
permitted to continue then it might reach activity F, 
meanwhile, when the extension completes it will re-enter 
activities C, D, and E. This behavior could lead to activi-
ties C and F executing concurrently, a behavior that is not 
expected from Fig. 5, where C and F are explicitly de-
picted as mutually exclusive. Hence, a candidate require-
ment for this concern is one that forbids D and E from 
executing when an instrument malfunctions.  
 
Figure 5. AD used for reentrancy discussion 
Another concern that arises as a result of potential reen-
trancy in the AD of Fig. 5 is the following. Suppose that, 
as discussed above, the instrument malfunctions while 
activity C is executing and the resulting extension loop 
consumes more time than initially expected. Conse-
quently, the concern is that during this time the AD’s pre-
condition might be satisfied again thereby inducing a re-
play of the scenario described in the AD; consequently 
activity C (and others) is executed more than once. This 
concern can be resolved using various kinds of NL re-
quirements many ways, such as: 
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R4: System A instrument malfunction recovery loop must 
take no longer than time T (calculated based on the inter-
val between successive collection times). Or, 
R5: The AD must have a precondition that prohibits re-
entrance. 
Note that while R5 is a straight-forward requirement to 
write in NL, it is can be rather costly to implement. 
Reentrancy is also a potential cause for concern regarding 
the meaning of a successful or failed termination of the 
depicted scenario. For example, consider the same sce-
nario described for the AD of Fig. 5, namely, the AD is 
reentered while the instrument malfunction extension is 
sub-scenario is playing. Afterwards, one of the two com-
putations playing on the AD reaches the terminal state. A 
potential concern is that the user considers this as an indi-
cation that the scenario has completed successfully while 
it still has a playing computation.  
Likewise, if one of the two computations terminates suc-
cessfully while the other reaches a failed terminal state (at 
the bottom end of the extension diagram) then it is unclear 
whether the AD as a whole should declare success or not.  
3.6 Real-time Constraints 
Many of the above-mentioned derived requirements dis-
cuss eventualities that “must” occur. Unbounded eventu-
alities are almost never testable or enforceable. Therefore, 
requirements such as R2 and R3 should be accompanied 
by a real-time constraint for the eventuality, such as: 
R2’: whenever schedule-downlink then activity Receive-
downlink must be performed within 10 seconds. 
Likewise, constraints on looping discussed in section 3.3 
can be specified in terms of real-time rather than number 
of iterations, such as: 
R6: whenever Receive-downlink fails it must succeed 
within 10 seconds. 
 
4 Conclusion 
We have shown a process for analyzing informal UML-1 
activity diagrams (a process that applies to message se-
quence diagrams as well) that identifies potential con-
cerns and associated natural-language requirement speci-
fications. The extension of this process, discussed in 
[Dr1], enables computer aided validation and verification 
of the systems behavior with respect to these concerns.   
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